2: Courlander B-5 (1937-1955) 1960 SV3 Haiti SV3

rather starve than work. An Englishman, James Franklin, wrote in 1828, for example:

> Experiments may be tried, laws may be enacted, and encouragement given, but nothing short of coercion and want will impel the Haytian to labour; and I have my doubts as to the practicability of enforcing labour in Hayti until the people have been better instructed, and their characters become changed.

As Franklin summarized it: "Nature is too generous to the Haytian; he never wants, and so never works for hire, as do free labourers in other countries."[1]

The early nineteenth century saw a flood of such bitter comments about the remains of the once rich and flourishing French colony of St. Domingue. The vast productivity of Haiti under French rule had made that colony one of the richest in the New World. The country was dotted with sugar mills, brick-covered wells, and warehouses; and carefully built brick aqueducts, irrigation canals, locks, and dams assured water for the plantations. In 1790, under the slave system, Haiti had exported 163,000,000 pounds of sugar. In 1826, a quarter of a century after the revolution, it was reported to have exported 33,000 pounds.

This falling off in production and exports doubtless had many causes, but one of the most significant was the Haitian's revolt not only against slavery but also against continuing the same kind of work he had performed as a slave. He saw not too much difference between forced, unpaid labor and working for any large landholder at subsistence wages. To the Haitian slave the inspiring battle cry of the French Revolution did not mean that all men would work together on another's man plantation and receive the same wages. It meant that every man would have his own garden to work for himself as he chose; every man would be a full citizen, with land of his own, free to come and go, to plant what he wished, to sell what he could. Despite long years under a colonial slave system, the Haitian still remembered a different way of life in Africa, where mass production for export was not the primary objective of labor.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of Haiti was not much more than half a million—less than one sixth of what it is today. There was plenty of land, and much of it had not yet been wasted by constant tilling and erosion. When the French were driven out, the Haitian peasant re-created an economic world of his own liking. The plantation system which had poured out sugar and coffee and indigo for Europe faded away, and in its place there sprang up an agrarian system which has continued until the present day. In the early

[1] [Franklin, The Present State of Hayti, p. 362. Cf. p. 351, category 116. -- Analyst]

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people: "If ever you refuse, or grumblingly accept, the laws which the genius guarding your destinies dictates to me for your happiness, you will merit the fate of ungrateful people. But perish that hideous idea!" There can be little doubt that he wished Haiti under his direction to become prosperous; but it is likewise clear that he was personally self-centred and inordinately grasping.

Each step Dessalines took to further his ambitions either for Haitian prosperity or for his own fortunes had its bearing upon the development of social classes in the country. Extermination of all remaining whites was one of the first tasks he set himself. On a promise of clemency he lured several hundred gullible French out of hiding, and butchered them in cold blood. His campaign of extirpation was methodical and thorough. To try to penetrate into the psychological background of this violence is to desert fact for speculation: it may have been a desire for revenge on the French, pure and simple; it may have been gloating sadism; he may have wished to warn France against any future attempts to regain possession of the country; or he may have wanted to notify his subjects of his intention to rule with severe discipline. Certainly this last aim was achieved, if any of his people did not already know, after two years of warfare, the extent of his ruthlessness. He ruled by fear and by threats, never by the cultivation of loyalties.

Apparently he was afraid that Napoleon would renew his efforts to subdue the former colony. To forestall such an attempt he ordered each of his governing subalterns to construct one great fort on the most prominent hill in their district—a scheme which led immediately to the institution of forced labor. He likewise devised a plan, not actually put into effect, for destroying all towns and plantations near the coast and moving the capital to an inland village; and so isolating Haitians from all contact with the outside world.

Turning to domestic policy, he faced a herculean task. The warfare of 1802–3 had left the country in chaos. Plantations and agricultural projects were almost totally ruined. All habits of steady industry had been lost. Dread of a possible new attack by the French made necessary a great army, and this in turn removed most able-bodied men from productive labor in the fields, while the construction of fortresses still further depleted the labor supply. The first census of free Haiti, in 1805 (probably not highly accurate), showed only 380,000 people, with the women outnumbering men by almost three to two.

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two. Here was a decline of about 150,000 from 1790.[2] It is a commentary on the man's forcefulness that in spite of all difficulties Dessalines established an effective economic organization. Its basis was serfdom.

Every citizen, he announced, must consider himself in one of two categories, laborer or soldier. There were to be no shirkers in the new Haiti; if a man was not in the army, he must do manual labor. Artisans who followed a craft counted as laborers. Women, since they could not join the army, must work shoulder to shoulder with their men. It was understood that direction of Haiti's new order would be carried on by state officials who were neither laborers nor soldiers, but these officials were to be so few that they would not constitute a separate third category.

This step of Dessalines' was a radical one. It proclaimed the mastery of state over individual; and even more significantly it divided the people according to economic task, rather than birth, wealth, color, or social status. At first the more ambitious citizens bore patiently with the arbitrary decree, thinking they might be able to achieve comfortable status under a lenient definition of "soldier" or else by sinecure tasks as officials. Their disillusionment was swift. Even swifter was the chagrin of the lowly folk who had been slaves, for they found themselves now in actual bondage to one of their own color.

All people except soldiers, ran the decree, must be "attached as cultivators to a plantation." This might be translated to read "bound to the soil." The vast majority of the people were forced willy-nilly into agriculture. It was "formally prohibited for a cultivator to desert the plantation to which he was assigned"; conversely, it was a crime to give asylum to a runaway cultivator, male or female.[3] If such conditions differed from slavery, they were at least close to what the mediaeval world knew as serfdom. But under this régime of forced labor the recently ravaged fields once more became productive: cotton plantations again covered the plain of the Artibonite, and sugar refineries were slowly rebuilt all over the country.

To forestall complaint from the people once again driven into

2. See, for an analysis of population figures, Placide Justin, *Histoire politique et statistique de l'Île d'Hayti, Saint-Domingue* (Paris, 1826), pp. 502–503.

3. A certain Mlle. Chapotin, of respectable family, was accused of having harbored a fugitive female cultivator, and, since she was unable to pay immediately the fine imposed upon her by the police at Port-au-Prince, she was condemned to serve a jail term.

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field labor, the ruler emphasized the clemency of his new régime. Labor the people must, but not under the whip; that arch symbol of slavery was abolished forever. The working day was shortened by a third. It was provided that, if just reason were shown, a man might even secure permission from his district commissioner to move from the plantation to which he was attached.

These were words. Facts were another matter. The overseers had been ordered to exact so much labor from their underlings, yet without whips; knowing no persuading power other than chastisement, they backed up their commands with blows of *lianes*, thick pliable vines which could be gathered anywhere in the island. Thus the laggard was driven, the law kept to the letter, and the overseer praised by his superiors. As for the working day, crops must be tended at the proper moment, so that the boasted shortening of hours generally came to little. Finally, the right to secure permission to move away from a plantation was effectively limited by the refusal of commissioners to grant any such request.

Every public expression of Dessalines showed a solicitude for the welfare of the workers, while his every act indicated that he regarded them as impersonal parts of the machine of state. He knew by his own former experience as a slave what a day's stint should be and the ruses used by laborers to avoid steady work; he was therefore able to order agricultural labor on a realistic basis.

The economic organization created by Dessalines provided the roots for the peasantry which was soon to develop as a characteristic form of Haitian life. Among these fundamental conditions were the existence of agriculture as a prevalent occupation, the immobility of all workers on the land, and a thorough schooling of the people in patient acceptance. Dessalines might theoretically have established some other economic system—a division of estates into small properties, for example, with each farmer a master of his own destiny; a democratic cooperative economy; slavery again; feudalism with a landed gentry. At critical times, one leader's choice may affect the whole future life of the country. The decision of Dessalines to keep the bulk of his people in servitude, without using the terminology of slavery, gave the new freemen no opportunity to become acquainted with work other than tillage. They were sent back to the only tasks they had ever known, their horizons were just as limited as before, their personal freedom just as restricted. The worst punishments of slavery, together with torture and gross overwork,

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therefore plantations must be made to yield the uttermost farthing if the nobleman was to pay for the necessities of strict court etiquette. It was by no means a childish whim which prompted Christophe to call himself a king; rather an intelligent utilization of the human material the leader had to work with. Vanity was to serve an economic and a political purpose.

Christophe perceived that the defect of Dessalines' reign had been lack of security, both of person and property. Agriculture is a long-term investment and so must be hedged about by orderly rules. To this end the monarch stated his laws clearly, charged a fixed tax—one fourth of the annual crop—which would enrich the kingdom while allowing the tenant-proprietor a reasonable profit, and then guaranteed that no arbitrary demands would be made. Certainly there was no pampering of the wealthy, but there was ample prosperity resulting from regularity and security.

The ordinary citizen was, as he had been, bound to the soil as an agricultural laborer. This quasi-serfdom, however, was comparative freedom. It simply meant that the home and work of a man must be at the plantation on which he had been born. Saturday afternoons and Sundays were free, so that the laborers might make the most of their opportunities to visit the nearest market village, to buy and sell small goods, gossip, and enjoy the sociability of being part of a crowd. Being bound to the soil meant simply that they could not move, when the impulse seized them, to another plantation or another part of the country. Those whose mothers or relatives were natives of a plantation must return to that estate, being forbidden to live in towns. No person, military or other, who did not derive his living from a plantation, could marry an agricultural worker—a prohibition designed to prevent workers from leaving estates because of family ties, and particularly to prevent women, as mothers of future cultivators, from deserting agriculture.

Medieval serfdom itself went no further in binding people to the soil. Indeed, it did not go so far in regulating the daily life of serfs. Under Christophe the cultivators lived according to a routine as strict as that of a school. Reveille was rung as early as three o'clock to arouse women to prepare breakfasts for their menfolk; by four or four-thirty the bell was sounded for the commencement of work, which began after prayers had been led by the overseer. At nine o'clock there was a pause for luncheon, and then a resumption of

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work until noon. A two-hour siesta followed, but from two until sunset there was steady work. Only after evening prayers was the worker free. During the day no cultivator might leave his task except for direst need. The lame and the halt were not required to till the fields, but must carry around buckets of drinking water, take care of the children, and do odd jobs about the estate.

Christophe made a steady and, in the main, successful effort to explain to the people the necessity of hard work on the plantation. As with the noblemen, the serfs knew precisely what was expected of them, and why. Their regimentation was strict, but understandable. It was clearly stipulated that if a worker shirked his job he was to be put in prison and made to do forced labor there. Laziness in the fields was to be punished by strokes from the overseer's liane. Hard and steady work was demanded during the whole thirteen years of Christophe's rule, but only rarely was there complaint, as there had been constantly under Dessalines, of cruelty on the part of overseers.

The quarter part of the total crop of any plantation was to go to the workers as wages, and, since production increased and prices rose, this quarter which they were free to spend as they pleased provided a powerful incentive to further industry. As compared with anything they had known before, the workers were now recipients of an ample income. On the plantations they cultivated the money crops of sugar and coffee. In addition, each family had its own garden plot on which to raise the food crops—yams, plantains, beans, and bananas—for personal use.[9]

Christophe was so far ahead of his time that he tried to introduce British methods of agriculture into his kingdom. The results were insignificant. The plough, although obviously superior in efficiency to the hoe, eliminated the sociable companionship of working in unison, and demanded horses and mules which the country lacked. The innovations were consequently too radical to be accepted. In the main, the agricultural methods of the kingdom continued to be those familiar in slave days.

Thirteen years of careful direction can fix many patterns of social routine. One of Christophe's rules was that no cultivator attached to

9. The staples of other countries, such as Irish potatoes, wheat, barley, and oats, did not flourish in Haiti. On the large plantations, indigo and cotton, which had been money crops in the French régime, were generally neglected, as they had been in the time of Dessalines.

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their districts, principally during the working hours of the day. They were held responsible for all consequences of their own negligence.

This whole flow of legislation was designed primarily for the protection of the great landed proprietors, yet there were other laws which aided the masses. In former days workers had been coerced through corporal punishment. This was by law now abolished. Temporary assignments of garden plots were required for each family of laborers; medical care must be provided at the expense of the planter; the aged and infirm must be guaranteed the right to keep their homes and gardens even though no longer able to work. Expectant mothers in the fourth month of pregnancy must be relieved of field work, with no limitation of their right to share in the estate's income; mothers of nursing children must be permitted to remain at home until the weaning of their infants.

A great concession to the workers was made by abolishing the office of "inspector of cultures." In the days of Toussaint and Dessalines each district of the country had had its inspector, whose duty it was to see that crop cultivation proceeded according to schedule.[27] This man's disapproval of conditions resulted in fines and personal chastisement. By abolishing the office Pétion effected a great saving in salaries, for there had been thousands of these inspectors; on the other hand, the watchfulness of the inspectors had kept agricultural production at a high level. With no officials to dog the footsteps of the workers, crops immediately fell off.

Pétion clearly expected la grande culture to be the prevailing mode of agriculture in the republic. He fostered all kinds of legislation regulating it, even aside from that already mentioned. For example, a complete schedule was prepared for the division of income of the estate.[28] But the entire system was too neatly worked out and artificial to be effective, particularly since it was not backed up with force. The threat of punishment removed, most workers began gradually, often deliberately, to sabotage the system. It was much more pleasant

27. Christophe followed his predecessors in keeping the district inspectors.

28. This could be very complicated. A tenant farmer might hire workers, and so have to share his half of the income with them. In such cases, the division of the money crops was to be made in kind or in money, at current prices, in the presence of the local justice, his assessors, and an officer of the *gendarmerie*. The workers' "fourth" was divided into portions of which three went to the first foreman, two to each of the skilled workers, one and a half to each male or female worker, and one half to each child laborer between ten and fourteen years of age.

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to spend one's time in the allotted garden patch than to cultivate sugar cane steadily in the heat of the day. In a garden there was more variety to the work, and more independent decision; in a cane field all must work in unison to be effective. Moreover, the yield from the garden was a daily thing, while that of the cane fields came but once a year. Less and less were the overseers able to get the tenants away from their gardens and into the fields.

Not all the sabotage came from the common folk. Landowners had their normal share of profit motive. The complex system of social security and benevolent stewardship ate away much of the income of the estate.[29] More important, the owners had had no experience of plantation management other than by directing forced labor. Corporal punishment was now abolished, but to the owner it was still unthinkable that there should be no coercion in plantation work. The laws protecting labor therefore left them bewildered, and they did not hold up their part of the system. Finding it expensive to maintain sugar machinery, impossible to engage docile workers, and necessary to finance social security, most of the "aristocrats" simply took the easier path of leasing their estates in small subdivisions, getting out of them what they could.

Another unexpected result of Pétion's general policy was to shift the main produce of the republic from sugar to coffee. Sugar had for decades been the staple crop of southern Haiti; but its cultivation requires scrupulous care and expensive machinery. Coffee, on the other hand, grows wild both in the lowlands and at heights of three thousand feet. It is "wild" in the sense that plants spring from seeds dropped by parent trees, without careful planting. When it became obvious that the workers were not to be persuaded to regular work in the cane fields, the landlords broke up the large plantations so necessary to sugar cultivation. Each tenant farmer was almost sure to find coffee trees on his rented plot of land. He would harvest the berries but would do little or nothing to tend and improve the plants, as he did not own them. In French days coffee trees had been pruned, fertilized, grafted; the new Haitian farmer simply let nature take its course. Pétion's careful planning resulted consequently in an entirely unplanned, accidental, and automatic adjustment to new conditions of life.

29. That the landlords did not too vigorously protest this system of care for the workers was due to their familiarity with similar care in slave days.

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South in general had the most loyal feeling toward a government which had been benevolently generous to them. A blend of the two might have been fruitful.

It was not any want of patriotism that caused Boyer to miss his great opportunity but rather a defect of ability. Desiring, like Pétion, to lead rather than to drive his people, he nevertheless lacked even more than his former chief the force of personality which might have persuaded them to work hard for the greater glory of Haiti. Despising the brutal compulsion exercised by Dessalines and Christophe, which he regarded as savage and too closely resembling the earlier methods of slave owners; wishing to emulate solely the gentleness of his predecessor, Boyer hoped for a number of years that his people would become industrious of their own accord. His hopes were frustrated. During his twenty-five-year presidency the mass of Haitians became so indifferent to pecuniary inducements that little work could be got from them beyond that required to produce necessary food. As commerce declined, the President was driven to fresh issues of debased currency and to the opening of mines in different parts of the country, though he knew that the richest mine Haiti possessed was its still fertile soil.

For the first seven years Boyer pursued a policy based on hopeful expectation, refusing to inaugurate any of the forceful measures of his black predecessors. But by 1823 the treasury, enriched though it had been by the surplus from Christophe's exchequer, was empty; in 1824 disbursements exceeded income. Convinced in 1825 that his *laissez-faire* policy was failing to produce results, he decided to heed the insistent counsel of those (including most of the aristocratic, landholding class) who advised the reëstablishment of a coercive system of agriculture. His officials showed him that nowhere in the country were sugar plantations any longer being cultivated on a great scale—except for a few estates run by government officials who could command the forced labor of convicts. The policy of offering cultivators a fourth of the total crop of a plantation as wages was luring practically no laborers to work.[37] Even the few owners who offered the fourth plus daily wages had no success. Quite simply, the average Haitian preferred to be his own master, working only when he wished, and particularly working only for himself and his family.

37. This fourth in wages must not be confused with the quarter in taxes abolished by Pétion. See page 46 for a discussion of the quarter-crop wage system.

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175 423 up so many of these, there was no way short of a revolution to reconstitute the now parceled estates. Obviously the Code did not envisage the control of serfs by small property owners, yet there were more small owners than large.

175 184 466 In the third place, the Spanish-speaking masses of the eastern part of the island had never experienced the kind of forced labor with which most Haitians had been at one time or another familiar. Their noncoöperation made enforcement difficult.

175 647 Finally, the administration of so detailed a plan called for the establishment, at once and yet in complete order, of a fully trained corps of bureaucrats, perfectly coöperating with each other, most of them educated, and all incorruptibly honest. If every literate person in the state had been drafted for service, Boyer could not have filled all the offices required by the Code.

175 465 434 After brief and piecemeal experience with the law in operation, moreover, even the few remaining large landholders turned against it. While they approved the provisions for forced labor, they discovered that to turn over to the workers a quarter or half of the annual crop, in a falling world market, gave too slim a profit.[42] Without the support even of its original sponsors, failure of the law was inevitable.

175 648 652 These factors alone would have been enough to kill the Code; but its real death blow came from an entirely different quarter. The year before the agricultural laws were passed, Boyer had achieved what he considered to be a political master stroke. He had made a financial settlement with France whereby Haiti, in return for a large sum in cash and regular annual payments for sixty years thereafter, should receive full recognition of independence from France; also the former mother country would renounce all claims to any properties in the country. Boyer had felt that the chief debilitating influence on the political and economic life of his people was the constant dread that France might one day return to claim her lost colony. To rid the nation of that incubus, therefore, seemed to him a high feat of statesmanship, no matter what the financial cost.[43]

[433 247] 42. Coffee, now the staple crop of Haiti, was meeting competition from the other coffee-producing countries of the world. To put the sugar manufactories into working condition again called for more money than was available.

[643 648] 43. Boyer's hand was forced to a certain extent by France, which had been exerting diplomatic pressure upon Haiti; the President, however, seemed to regard the settlement as a distinct coup.

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The result was entirely different from Boyer's expectations. As a French critic graphically puts it, the Haitians

> who had never had more than a borrowed energy—that inspired by fear of French invasion—when they saw themselves freed, by a solemn treaty, from all attack on their coasts, seemed to allow their arms to drop relaxed at their sides, saying, *Let's take a rest.* The soldier who up till now had squeezed his body into a uniform and had subjected himself to European discipline, shouldering his arms, staring straight ahead as if seeing nothing, now began to leave unbuttoned the uniform which choked him, dragged a mattress into his sentry-box so that he might sleep through his watch, and let his cross slip to the earth never to pick it up again.[44]

In short, the Haitian army as a disciplined force ceased to exist, and with it all authority of its officers. Boyer had counted upon the army to enforce the provisions of the Code Rural, but now a soldier's life was a paid sinecure. By gaining political security Haiti had inadvertently lost its last chance of economic prosperity through a system of forced labor.

Wherever the Code was put into partial operation, revenue from plantations continued to decline. The price of real estate dropped proportionately. It was a simple matter for workmen who had signed contracts to avoid carrying out their stipulations, and just as simple to evade the law requiring fifteen acres' minimum for a single holding. Practically every Haitian wanted to own a bit of land; once he had acquired his bit, however small, he had (or so he felt) earned an exemption from directed labor.

Only on estates near the few big towns, where government officials were concentrated, was there much pretense of trying to enforce the Code. Sentries at the gates of Port-au-Prince were authorized to confiscate plantains, yams, or fruit brought by any worker who, in contravention of the Code, had strayed to market on a forbidden day, but sentries soon acquired the habit of not seeing countryfolk who passed the gates. Reports kept cropping up that rural policemen were robbing poor cultivators of their coffee under pretense of protecting them from the penalties for breach of the law; this suggests that the Code was used rather for graft than for the stimulation of agriculture.

By and large, however, the Code was merely ignored. Agents could not be found who were willing to stand in any community

44. Lepelletier de Saint-Remy, *Saint-Domingue*, II, 181.

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can seldom find persons disposed either to occupy or purchase them. There are some instances of proprietors leasing their lands to persons who undertake to cultivate them, for which they receive about one-third of the produce; but this is far from being general, and I imagine can only be accomplished by military men who have the command of troops, and who are thereby enabled to till them by working parties daily sent out for that purpose.[47]

An interesting side light is provided by a Quaker visitor, Candler, who in 1842 wrote that he was struck by the entire equality which seemed to exist between servant and master. Every workman was addressed in courteous manner, as "*mon fils.*"[48] On inquiry, Candler was told that the profits of planting were good that year, laborers were scarce, and it was therefore "necessary to conciliate all by kindness, or no work would be done."

A particularly grim account of the state of cultivation near the close of Boyer's administration (1842) is given by a Frenchman:

> The fields of Haiti are dead. There where under slavery thousands of tons of sugar were made, now one sees only a few crops and a little syrup to turn into raw rum. Lively growths of cactus cover with thorns the acres of cane, of fields, of pastures deserted by the hand of man; the cactus invades the towns, coming even up to the heart of the cities, flourishing in the midst of ruins, as if to insult the inhabitants. . . . On the one hand, no one cultivates with regularity, because everyone is discouraged by the thefts of cane and fruit by people without any moral discipline, and in a country without police; while on the other hand, people complain of being poor, and of not being able to devote enough money to indispensable improvements. . . . And if the proprietors cannot even make work progress, imagine the condition of the poor![49]

As the people grew individually poorer, the value of the land sank until it was useless for an owner to try to prevent squatting on his estate. Holdings grew smaller and smaller, in spite of the prohibition on sales of real estate in parcels less than fifteen acres. Good land might be had in every part of the island quite cheaply, much of it even from the government which had enacted the restrictive law. Any man not satisfied with his condition as a paid laborer might, if

47. James Franklin, *The Present State of Hayti (Saint Domingo)*, (London, 1828), p. 313.

48. John Candler, *Brief Notices of Hayti* (London, 1842), p. 37.

49. V. Schoelcher, *Colonies étrangères et Haïti: résultats de l'émancipation anglaise* (Paris, 1842), II, 263 ff.

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The crop-sharing system, economically debilitating though it was,

had one great advantage to the laborer: he felt himself free and independent, with the right to engage himself to any man or to refrain from working altogether. No longer was he bound to the soil of one plantation, forced to labor under a "driver," forbidden to dance or to sleep when the mood seized him. This new freedom imparted to him a self-consequence which made him, in his own estimation, almost as important as a freeholder. The master could not say to his men, "Go into such a field and dig cane holes. The clouds are gathering and we must get in the young plants"; or, "Weed such a field," or "Prune the coffee trees today." Neither could he send a band of young people at his discretion to pick the coffee berries as they ripened, or to cull the bad berries, when pulped and dried, from the good. Every man was, so to speak, master of his own house and his own hours, considering himself at liberty to work with his family at almost any time and in any manner he pleased.

Herein lay the fatal defect of the crop-sharing system. There was no way of coming to an agreement among the laborers on an estate as to the amount of labor to be performed by each. One man was weaker than another; one more disposed to drink or to loaf than another. The whole group of, say, twenty families was to share in common the half or the quarter of the gross produce; but who should measure the exact proportion which would fall in justice to each family?

These annual disagreements led to a compromise which ultimately broke down even the moderate-sized estates. The proprietor, in order to avoid disputes, divided his fields among his laborers, allowing one family five acres, another ten, a third twenty, according to the nature of the land and the sort of produce which could be raised upon it. True, the proprietor lost by this division all the benefits of concentrating labor in a particular field at a particular season; also, if he wished to have necessary work done in haste which required a large number of laborers, he had to bribe them (generally by a drink of rum or tafia). Obviously, when such difficulties stood in the way of necessary repairs and improvements, the proprietors simply preferred to allow their estates to deteriorate. Like the workers, they acquired an attitude of not worrying about the future; unlike the frame of mind of the workers, their attitude came from resigned acceptance of the inevitable, not from preoccupation with the present.

Certain astute proprietors tried to get as many families together as could act in concert without jarring or jealousy, and to induce them,

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by persuasion, to do as much work as possible for his and their own interests. In a few cases the success of such efforts was tolerably good; but one worker disposed to be sullen or idle, or even not physically strong, might throw the whole scheme into disorder. One's own profits would be cut by the misdeeds of others even when one had himself been industrious. This caused a decline of incentive, sometimes among a whole group of potentially good workers, because one or two of the number shirked. Probably the most patent evil of such arrangements was that every laborer realized that he did not suffer as directly for idleness or neglect as when working for himself; his fellow workers shared the consequences of his misconduct in some degree, and his employer in a still greater measure. The driving force of individual responsibility was removed.

Boyer and Inginac, foreseeing just such disorder, had tried to provide against it in the Code Rural by giving summary powers to local judges to inflict penalties upon lazy or malingering workers. Quite aside, however, from the loss of time and the inconvenience to both parties in going constantly to a judge for his decision, the proprietor was afraid to act on this principle to any extent, since if he did so he might lose his laborers altogether.

It was a rare proprietor, then, who could hope to make much of a fortune out of his plantation. More and more the landowners, having subdivided their fields, grew lax in overseeing them. The workers, freed from constant supervision, accustomed by long habit to living in one hut, and unconsciously developing a mentality which made them feel, as did American squatters on frontier lands, that they had a right to the land they tilled, imperceptibly developed into peasants. The state's remaining properties, no longer under cultivation, were invaded by families of small farmers, and the government took no steps to oust them or send them back to privately owned plantations. The estates of individual aristocrats underwent the same fate if not carefully watched. Theoretically, it was the duty of the army to drive out squatters, to force laborers back into "proper" agricultural work; but the army consisted of peasant youths who would not turn against people of their own group.

Legal irregularity was gradually sanctioned by the passage of time, usage being a stronger guarantor of rights than unenforced laws on the statute books.

Haitian peasantry, to sum up, began as the unplanned, undesired

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an ineffective government, momentarily in the hands of colored élite. Attempting to dominate politics was a numerically small group of colored people and a still smaller group of Negroes. Although prevailingly black, the army might be, and in the later nineteenth century was continually, used by whichever group offered more. A third power, a middle class, might have balanced these antagonistic factions. Lacking such a moderating influence, Haiti was the victim of recurrent revolutionary movements.

At the time of Boyer, actual democracy would have been no safeguard, for it would have meant the supremacy of ignorance. His rule was the beginning of unfortunate days for Haiti. After the auspicious opening years, the President became an impotent onlooker as his country declined. It is instructive to compare the Haiti of Dessalines and Christophe with the Haiti of 1843, only one generation later.[62]

The Haiti of 1806 had been a beehive of activity. Soldiers, foremen, and policemen then stood over the workers with lianes to force them to labor for the benefit of their state. Production was carefully planned, an ordered hierarchy making every person in the country responsible to another higher than himself until the ruler was reached at the pinnacle. The cardinal fault of any laborer was to shirk at his task. The year 1843, on the contrary, found Haiti in a condition of quiescence which, to those who remembered the old days, resembled torpor. The central government had ceased to drive its citizens, and its half-hearted attempts at persuasion were futile. Overseers, drivers of gangs of workers, soldiers whose duty it was to enforce labor, had disappeared from the scene. Every man was his own master.

The standard of living in 1806 as in 1843 was low; but in the earlier year there had been a promise of great things to come once Haiti had rebuilt what war had destroyed. The succeeding years, however, failed to inculcate into the people a desire for any higher standard of life. Country dwellers were benighted; ignorance deepened the habit

62. Haiti has never had an accurate census, so that it is impossible even to estimate the total population of the country either in 1806 or in 1843. The figures of 380,000 and 800,000 given by some authors for the two years are mere guesses. Likewise, one can only deduce the proportion of people in the main economic and social categories; probably seventy-five per cent of the Haitians were serfs in 1806 and the same percentage peasants in 1843; the "aristocracy," including all who did not derive a living by manual labor or army service, could hardly have reached five per cent in either year; the army, house servants, day laborers in the towns, and petty businessmen would make up the other twenty per cent.

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Haiti under Dessalines still had many building

of French con-
175 struction, both plantation mansions and slave quarters. With forced
178 labor available these had been kept in a measure of repair. Christophe,
331 not content with leftovers from colonial days, had sponsored architectural activity all over his kingdom; if his citadel is the most noteworthy example, there are also to his credit lesser palaces and government warehouses. Almost no building was done by Pétion and Boyer, however, and by the 1840's the constructions of the French
[731] had fallen into serious disrepair. Severe earthquakes and fires quickly ruined what time had already weakened. By the middle of the century one saw, instead of trim slave quarters near great mansions, a few straggling towns of one-story houses, the hillsides dotted with ramshackle huts, and the plains with daubed shacks.

175 From great estates to tiny plots; from carefully tilled fields to
178 small gardens in a wilderness; from financial prosperity to debt;
181 from directed enterprise to sloth; from an attitude of hopeful de-
433 termination to one of tolerance for things as they are—these are the striking contrasts of the two periods. It could hardly have been imagined in Christophe's day that the smart, disciplined Dahomet would be succeeded by casual ragamuffins who dozed on their tilted chairs while on sentry duty. Christophe had liked his subjects to be well dressed, and insisted on it; but the British consul in Boyer's time wrote that "the laborers are, generally speaking, nearly naked; in fact, adults only wearing what is barely necessary to prevent indecent exposure, while the children of both sexes run about without covering of any kind."[64]

175 It was the parceling of landed estates combined with the disap-
178 pearance of forced labor which initiated the transition from serfdom
433 to peasantry. Personalities as dynamic as Christophe's or as brutal as
[466] Dessalines' would have been required to keep the people in a servile
[483] condition in a land of tropical fertility. Contemporary foreign judg-
[461] ment was almost unanimous in placing the blame for declining
[164] prosperity upon indolence (the word is continually repeated, generally preceded by the adjective "natural"). It may be noted in passing that no one at the time seems to have realized how widespread were the debilitating diseases of hookworm and malaria, which can make apparently husky men prefer rest to work. Responsibility for economic failure rests as much upon the governing class,

64. Charles Mackenzie, *Communications Received at the Foreign Office* [of Great Britain] *Relative to Hayti* (1829), p. 86.

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however, as on the masses. Nothing was done to educate the people and so inculcate in them the desire for a higher standard of living. Where food is easily got, the government gentle, and the people ignorant, one hardly looks for progress.

Foreigners who knew Haiti were prophesying doom through most of Boyer's administration. The British consul was the most vocal of these prophets. He toured the whole republic in 1828 and found only local variations on a sorry state of affairs. At Jacmel he reported a parceling of the land, a decline of plantations, and a horror of corporal punishment by the people; it seemed to surprise him that every blow given a worker was returned in kind. In the arrondissements of Saint-Marc and Gonaïves cotton continued to be the chief crop as it had been in French days but quantity and quality had declined. At Petite-Rivière relative prosperity prevailed because the lands there were under the control of a former lieutenant of Christophe, who managed to apply that king's stern discipline to his workers. From Gonaïves to Cap Nicolas Môle cultivation was at a low ebb; near Cap-Haïtien everything agricultural was in ruins.[64]

Industry and discipline, the two commonest characteristics of the Haiti of Christophe, were precisely those most notably absent from the Negro masses of 1843. Obedience had given way to independence of behavior. A visitor in 1842 describes the actual condition of a plantation in the arrondissement of Furcy. Where formerly thirty-two families had toiled industriously, under strict overseers who were free to inflict physical punishment upon laggards, now only twelve families remained, the rest having become "freeholders." These twelve had a crop-sharing agreement with the owner of the estate whereby they received the income from half the 10,000 pounds of coffee yielded by the land; but also they

> appropriate to themselves almost the whole of the provisions which the land furnishes, sending down only a few of the rarer vegetables, beans, peas, and artichokes, to their master, for his table at Port-au-Prince, and supplying his need when he comes to reside for a few days in the country. This he knows very well, but has no alternative but to bear it quietly.[65]

63. See particularly *ibid.*, pp. 94, 103–105. The consul clearly felt that the only hope of salvation in Haiti was a reintroduction of some sort of coercion such as that used by Dessalines and Christophe.

64. Candler, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

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reported in Haiti that although they joined patriotically in the cheering when the Marines embarked in 1934, many of them shed tears to see the departure of 2,000 monthly salaries, most of which had been enriching the local tills. Indeed, the country came much closer to establishing a mercantile middle class during the Occupation than ever before. The only real control left behind by the Americans was an overseer of the national budget, destined to leave as soon as Haiti's external debt was finally paid off. To that end the government saved rather than spent, so that businessmen found no comfort in the state of economic affairs, particularly during a decade of world depression and European disturbance. Nationalist economic theories in Europe have upset Haitian markets, so that the élite thriftily save their pennies against hard times instead of spending them freely on present luxuries. The American overseer of the budget withdrew in 1941.

At many points the forces of the Occupation touched unwittingly upon deep-rooted prejudices of the Haitian people. In order to secure laborers for road construction the Marines revived an old corvée law of Christophe's time, requiring forced labor on public works at the need of the government. Many of the ill-nourished peasants were taxed beyond their physical powers by work on the roads, so that an armed revolt by caco guerrillas broke out. Its suppression required months of time and cost many lives, leaving in its train a great deal of ill will.

The efficient Americans also came to grief when they attempted to make Haitians orderly in the American way. Land titles were in chaos, as we have noted. American experts wished to find a basis for internal taxation, so that economic reform might be effective and permanent. The effort to have people declare their claims so that these might be properly registered had to be given up after a few weeks, for the peasant owners knew without written deeds their local boundaries, and among the squatters those who realized their title might not stand under strict investigation were understandably averse to having questions of property tenure raised by the authorities of an alien and interfering government.

Wherever Marine barracks were located, there were centres of a cultural dissemination which was bound in the long run to affect Haitian ideas and practices. Automobiles, radios, amusements, even the daily conversation of the Marines, all left their mark upon a people who had been effectively isolated from the world for more than a century.

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Granted these obvious difficulties, there is still little to be said for the zeal or integrity of churchmen in Saint-Domingue. Father Cabon cites a report to Rome in 1794, which, he remarks, "was not designed to be made public, and does not bear the earmarks of passion," and which flatly states that "since the expulsion of the Jesuits, the curés have for the most part led lives so indecent . . . that the citizens and Negroes have lost all the sentiments of religion which the Jesuits gave them."[3] There had been distinguished churchmen in Saint-Domingue before 1750, authors, scientists, teachers of some note, but none appeared thereafter. The rich French colony was not a bright star in the Catholic crown.

Undeterred by those who might have been their spiritual guides, the white people followed the easy path of self-indulgence. The universal testimony of visitors is that, with a few notable exceptions, immorality and cruelty were daily commonplaces. To make a fortune was the prime ambition of every white man, since money made possible the luxurious enjoyment of this world's goods. Protest against money-making or soft living would have been futile. Administrative agents turned public office to their own profit; judges sold justice to the highest bidder; planters drove their slaves to death; and priests dispensed religious solace for a tidy sum.

The freedmen, who in everything patterned their lives after social leaders in the white planter class, had no more concern for religion than their models. They attended Mass occasionally as a social event, where they might see and be seen. When in the latter days of the colony discriminatory legislation required that colored persons sit in separate parts of the church, most of the affranchis simply refrained from attending Mass: their religious zeal was not so great as to make them submit to the public shame of segregation. In their daily lives, likewise, they followed the example of the white planters in pursuing pleasure rather than sobriety, "culture" rather than religious zeal. Like the whites, they were often licentious in their conduct. When it came their turn to direct affairs of state in free Haiti, there was little interest in spiritual matters among them. The intellectuals of the group paid homage to the liberal philosophers of the century rather than to religious thinkers.

If religion was at a low ebb in the prosperous days of the colony, it almost disappeared in the excitement of the years following the

3. Ibid., p. 35. revolt of the slaves (1791).

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as it is cursed by the present military despotism, the utmost that the women of Haiti can do is to keep their country just above the waters of bankruptcy and their households from complete despair.[9]

Since 1910 the military has been reformed, and the women are not mulcted by soldiers and officers; Sir Harry's prophecy regarding the material benefits of removing the curse of military despotism was overly optimistic.

Rounding out the economic life of the peasant is the market, which provides an outlet for whatever surplus is produced, a source of needed supplies and a modicum of money, as well as an almost imperative diversion for hard-working women. The origin of Haitian markets may have been either French or West African, for both regions had them. They were certainly in existence by 1803 in Saint-Domingue, for Madiou speaks of the trade of the plainsmen of the Cul-de-Sac with the holders of what then was called Port Républicain (now Port-au-Prince), adding: "Each Sunday at Croix-des-Bouquets a market was held which brought together more than 4,000 cultivators, male and female, with the permission of the overseers or proprietors."[10] That so large a number came to the market is an indication of the social as well as the economic nature of this institution. Similarly, in the North in 1803, "Rochambeau, now master at the Cape, set about attending to the market established at Petit-Anse in July. After having suppressed all the markets which existed around the Cape, he opened a single and general one, 13th August, at Petit-Anse, one league from the city." The French general was making use of a familiar economic device to carry forward the economic life of the colony during the trying period of the wars.

In independent Haiti it was an almost immediate development that the women generally should do the marketing, the men being either required to work on the land or busy at military duty. It came to be accepted quite simply that going to market was a woman's work. From 1843 on through most of the century there was an additional reason why peasant men would not go to the market towns: recruits were needed, both for the army and whatever revolutionary coup might be brewing; a man who did not relish fighting did better to stay out of sight in the hills. In fact, this has even been called the chief

9. *The Negro in the New World*, pp. 196–197.
10. Thomas Madiou, *Histoire d'Haïti*, III, 24, 54.

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reason for which women assumed a larger part of the agricultural work than in the early days of the century: to keep their husbands indoors during the hours of daylight.

Haitian markets seemed to fascinate foreign visitors a hundred years ago as they do today. One Englishman, describing the markets at Cap-Haïtien and Gonaïves, said that riding one morning to market in the latter small town he passed 465 persons and all sorts of animals. "The women as usual were decently dressed; and the men were more respectable than any we had seen on our route: they were evidently small cultivators who live on their own freeholds. . . . All were cheerful and happy."[11]

Ever since force was withdrawn from the economic life of the Haitians—that is, since 1820—a steady round of criticism has been leveled at the "laziness" of the average male. Much of this can be discounted as coming from unsympathetic white foreigners who visited Haiti to find proof of Negro inferiority; some of it again is not significant, since it is the product of élite essayists who cherished the prepossession that the black was born to menial labor, and that if he did not work he had small reason for existence. The fact remains that not even friendly authors have been able to refrain from comment upon the inertia of the Haitian man, whether of the 1830's or, indeed, the present day. It is worth selecting half a dozen of the earlier criticisms, ranging from 1826 to 1860—two by Haitians, two by Englishmen, and two by Americans. Impressionistic, they nevertheless establish a basis from which to gauge the accuracy or inaccuracy of the charge.

In 1826, Placide Justin, drawing most of his material from the notes of the British agent in the Antilles, wrote: "The Haitian man is characterized by an almost unbelievable inertia. He is practically without ambition in political as well as in private life. No one seems to worry about tomorrow."[12] Two years later the Englishman, James Franklin, compared the régimes of Christophe in the North and of Pétion and Boyer in the South; with the former he was entirely sympathetic, but in 1828

the state of ignorance prevailing among the people in the mountains and the interior parts is almost inconceivable. It appears as if the work of civilization had not commenced, and that the people had not taken one

11. John Candler, *Brief Notices of Hayti*, pp. 25, 26.
12. *Histoire politique et statistique de l'île d'Haïti*, p. 336.

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114 175 642 171 consider it novel when it changes little but detail; and some of Haiti's seventeen documents were too short-lived to be significant. Haiti shows her Frenchness in this constitution making, this love of being logical and having the details all written down in proper order.

175 To try to analyze the content of so many documents would be a work of supererogation.[5] A brief comment upon each, however, will improve one's acquaintance with the mind of Haitian statesmen.

175 642 466 1801. Toussaint L'Ouverture's constitution, laying the framework of his venture as director of the colony while still acknowledging its relationship to France. In it he announced himself governor-general for life with the right to name his successor, thereby becoming the forerunner of the strong-man principle in politics. The most important part of this constitution was its detailed organization of the forced-labor system.

175 642 563 1805. Dessalines' constitution establishing the empire. In many respects it did not differ from Toussaint's previous document, for the same military organization was preserved, and the same system of forced labor; otherwise, there was little structure of government. One article was included which was to appear in every other constitution of Haiti up to 1918: "No white man shall set foot on this territory as master or as landowner."[6] In other respects there were sagacious provisions which did not endure. For example, the generic name of "blacks" was adopted for all Haitians, of whatever color. 175 642 The Emperor was trying thus to forestall the dissensions which inevitably must result from the growth of social classes based on skin [463] color. Another important provision was that every citizen who was not an ordinary cultivator must learn and practice some mechanical art. This was not merely a thrust at the aristocratic pretensions of the old affranchis, but also an endeavor to make Haiti industrious and self-sufficient. Except in the North, where Dessalines' deputy Christophe kept the requirement, the article was honored only in the breach. The social situation was touched at one other point: "No one is worthy of being a Haitian who is not a good father, a good son, a good husband, and a good soldier." Parents were forbidden to [428] disinherit their children. Although, as has been shown, the Emperor

5. Such an analysis was made by Louis-Joseph Janvier, *Les Constitutions d'Haïti, 1801–83* (Paris, 1886).

6. He had made this declaration first on April 28, 1804; at that time the words "No white man" read "No colonist nor European."

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Patrick Henry, Randolph, and Samuel Adams as well. Madiou estimates that there were 52,500 men in the army in 1804, when Haiti's population was less than 400,000.[12]

Fear of the return of the French kept the army large, and the administration of agricultural affairs under both Dessalines and Christophe was in charge of it. The construction of a fortress in every district put laborers under the direct influence of the military.[13] In addition to the corvée, or forced labor, required to construct these fortifications, the workers of the nation in the time of Dessalines also had to clear the hillsides and the ravines connecting valleys, and plant them with bananas, yams, plantains, and other provisions to supply the garrisons which manned the forts.

The Emperor left his army to feed and clothe itself. Occasional rations were given as a part of wages, but they were irregularly distributed. In the South particularly the troops began to murmur and desert, stirred up by their mulatto officers who were themselves no better rewarded, and who were already beginning their plot to overthrow the Emperor. The accusation was made that the money which should have gone to the army was being used on Dessalines' mistresses. The soldiers indulged themselves in that most damaging of Haitian weapons, the witty song, full of double meanings but deadly in its thrust at public personages; by these symbolic songs the fall of Dessalines was not only predicted but actually prepared.

Christophe kept a military state, but he had learned many lessons from watching affairs under Dessalines. Realizing that he could not trust the preservation of his régime to the fickleness of an army which had seen his rise to power and had already deserted its first commander in chief, knowing too that there was treason even among his own guards, he made a contract with a company of foreign merchants for the transportation of twenty thousand blacks from Africa. These were to make up a military force independent of the Haitians,

12. *Histoire d'Haïti*, III, 122.

13. Each general was commanded by Dessalines to build a fort on one of the mountains in his district. The design seems to have been left to the general. A few of the fortifications were truly impressive. Christophe built La Ferrière near Milot in the North; Pétion the fortress of Jean-Jacques at Grand Fond, four leagues from Port-au-Prince; Capoix called his Les Trois Pavillons, in the range of mountains back of Port-de-Paix; Cangé and Yayou together built Crampon near Léogane; Magloire Ambroise constructed a fortress near Cap Rouge and called it by that name; Geffrard built Platon near Les Cayes; Pétion built Madiane near Jérémie; François began but did not finish Le Bonnet Carré near Aquin.

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policy of encouraging trade with his friends and prohibiting it with his enemies—both arbitrarily. The variation of Pétion was a sort of mercantilism, with set high tariffs.

What Dessalines planned was in terms of Western statecraft so weird that white onlookers felt they were restrained in calling Dessalines a transplanted African tribal chieftain. So passionately intense was the fury of that general against all whites that he took every precaution he could devise to prevent face-to-face dealings between his Haitians and foreigners. By deceit, treachery, and ingenious cruelty he conducted a massacre which deserves comparison with that of Saint Bartholomew: this effectively rid the country of white residents. Since for a time Haiti would have to depend for economic survival upon trade with foreigners, Dessalines next conceived a project whereby the whole population would be gathered in the centre of the island, in the most protected valleys and the gorges of the highest mountains. In these fastnesses the people would never see a white but would work on the land, producing sugar and coffee and cotton for export without ever leaving their local habitations. On the seacoast would be established certain "counters" over which a few incorruptible Haitians, chosen by the Emperor himself, would sell local products and buy the necessary imported goods. Impregnable fortresses were to guard access to the interior,[1] which would be reached by new roads from the seacoast "counters." Every seaport was to be destroyed as soon as new towns could be built in the back country. Already when his death intervened Dessalines had moved his capital from the Cape (that is, Cap-Haïtien, formerly Cap Français) to the inland village of Marchand (in the department of the Artibonite; now renamed Dessalines), and his next plan was to transfer Port-au-Prince eight leagues inland to the plantation Dérance, among the mountains.

Dessalines has been thought absurd, childish, barbaric. But there is something poignant, even tragic, in this fiery determination of the black chieftain, bitter over the cruelties and indignity to which his people had been subject for decades, to use this alien island as best he could and preserve his people at any cost from such another domination.

Despite his scheme for ultimate isolation of the people, Dessalines kept everyone steadily at work by the forced-labor system instituted

1. See p. 247 and note 13. under Toussaint.

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175 Haiti under Dessalines seemed to be flourishing, although it was
433 less productive than under the French colonial régime. This was partly because the material damage of the wars had been too great to be quickly repaired; partly it was because many of the free Haitians had discovered ways of disappearing into the remote valleys, there to live the life of independent squatters, safe from the blows of Dessalines' overseers. Tables of exports showed that sugar production was rapidly declining, and that coffee was now becoming the principal crop of the country.[4] Many cane fields, indeed, were turning into rugged thickets, their mills and refineries falling to ruins beside the clogged irrigation ditches.

175 It was a bewildering "system," then, this instituted by Dessalines:
● 466 intense activity of serfs on government plantations, but an increasing
439 number of deserting squatters; foreign trade encouraged, yet run by
579 principles of local favoritism. Even the old-fashioned practice of piracy was reëstablished, for the Emperor gave letters of marque to some of his subjects who owned ships, allowing them to pursue French and Spanish vessels as the rightful prey of an enemy country. Sometimes these Haitian corsairs even disturbed smaller English merchant ships. Finally, it was Dessalines who said to his favorites, "*Plumez la poule* [that is, the Haitian people], *mais prenez garde qu'elle ne crie pas.*"

175 Christophe, upon his accession to power in the North, completely
439 abandoned the fantastic schemes of Dessalines for putting an end to
437 all contact between Haitians and foreigners. Among his earliest acts were efforts to undo the economic measures of the Emperor. In his first address he proclaimed certain free ports, announcing that the flags of all nations would be respected and property protected.[5] Next he abolished the consignment system of trading, allowing all foreign traders free access to Haitian merchants. This open system did away with the need of smuggling.

175 Because Christophe was almost pathetically anxious to make a
439 good impression upon Great Britain, he was scrupulous in living up
698 to his promises of security of property and justice in commercial dealings—to British merchants. The United States fared ill at the King's hands, for it was a young republic which had by refusing

4. See note on this chapter, p. 320, section 4.

5. His constitution of 1807 likewise makes this promise: "The government solemnly guarantees to foreign merchants the security of their persons and property."

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élite toward *les noirs*. The mildest expression of general opinion is that it would be a waste of time to try to educate the masses, for they are so nearly like animals that they could not absorb even the simplest education. Peasants eat when they are hungry, rise and go to sleep with light and darkness, are unable to count, like animals sense changes in weather; peasants are kindly but stupid, like donkeys: this is the kind of summary one hears from the mouths of the élite. It is possible that the élite are merely imitating the attitude toward the Negro of many white people they have seen.

[466]

Treatment of servants is revealing. They are often reviled for their thickheadedness. When one remonstrates with an employer for his frequent upbraiding of workmen, there is sure to be a look of pained surprise. Said one man: "You can no more hurt the feelings of a peasant than you can hurt the feelings of a mule." Servants simply do not feel as human beings do, but must be "broken," like a horse. This is not to say that many kindly employers do not exist, but rather that working people are not regarded as belonging to the higher orders of nature. A Catholic priest who devoted a good part of his time to work in the hills was told by some of his élite parishioners that this was a waste of time, for such dull people could not possibly benefit from his teachings.

Thoughtful men, on the other hand, know well enough that it is possible to improve the lot of the people. But if the peasant should be well educated he would become ambitious; where then would be the monopoly which is now held by the aristocrats on wealth, government, education? Merest self-interest prompts one to defend the status quo. This definitely worries many of the upper group. Aware that so long as conditions remain as they are Haiti will be poor and backward, they are nevertheless not ready to promote what would be a thoroughgoing social revolution. If any government should become oversolicitous for the well-being of the masses, it would soon find itself bitterly opposed by the upper class. In the long run, what will be the result of keeping things as they are? Élite who know their history can find several possible answers, no one of which appeals to them: a peasants' revolt, a Reign of Terror, intervention by a foreign power. They are on the horns of a dilemma: if as rulers they promote material welfare, they lose their present positions of security; if they do not promote a change, violent change will unseat them.

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3. Pétion, Boyer, and Inginac as Administrators

Pétion lived very simply in the South, like a plain republican magistrate. He sat on his piazza, accessible to all his people. He had a quiet way of answering his opponents which did not make enemies of them. He made his secretary answer every letter that arrived, no matter how small; many were simply inquiries about the President's health. Yet the wars between Pétion and Christophe dragged on from 1807 to 1812,[1] draining the finances of the republic. Not only the crops declined: so also did most of the public improvements instituted by the colonial planters; so did trade; so did habits of industry. Everything seemed to conspire against hard work. The rich plains of the Cul-de-Sac and the Artibonite Valley were ravaged by fire and warfare; necessary equipment for sugar making was destroyed, the money for new machines and buildings was unavailable; and the men were drawn away from their land by military duties.

Inginac, Boyer's secretary of state, after the Revolution of 1843 had got rid of both the President and his secretary, wrote his memoirs. There are some revealing passages. Inginac reports that Pétion told him only forty days before his death that Boyer was a man of probity and delicacy, "but unhappily he is petulant; he is too set in his ways to conciliate those who might assist him. In everything *he* wants to dominate, and he will bring unhappiness to the country if he does not change." Inginac cites cases to show that Pétion's prophecy was correct. Boyer in 1820 repealed the most unpopular laws, particularly those requiring personal corvée and the repair of public roads; but instead of taking advice from his cabinet on important economic matters, he frequently announced that he was president and would not be run by anybody. Consequently, according to Inginac, he made mistakes which might have been avoided.[2] Defending himself, the former secretary offers a clue to the failure of the régime—possibly unavoidable—by showing that the administration merely suggested, did not require, action:

"Have I not constantly, not only preached and corresponded about the necessity of making agriculture prosperous, but also given work at as high wages as the treasury could afford? Have I not created habitations on lands formerly totally uncultivated, putting formerly idle men to work? Have I not published at my own expense, although I directed the National Printery, methods for cultivating tobacco and coffee plants, of which I distributed gratis several thousand copies?"[3]

In spite of all encouragement which the administration could offer, agricultural production continued to decline, while expenses increased, and external trade fell off from a third to a half. The government had to borrow from the banking firm of Lafitte in Paris to find even the interest for

1. Hostilities between the two parts of Haiti ceased about 1812 because of the mutual fear on the part of Christophe and Pétion of Napoleon's ascendancy, and the threat which this constituted to the whole former colony. Their war had ravaged the plantations and removed laborers from the soil. Then came the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain, cutting off many of the supplies which Haiti drew from both countries. There was accordingly an unwritten truce, with no further hostilities. A neutral territory of two leagues between the boundaries of the two states was tacitly agreed upon: neither army was to enter it. This was the rich plain of Boucassin, once the garden of the island, now a wilderness.

2. Joseph Balthazar Inginac, *Mémoires* (Kingston, Jamaica, 1843), pp. 32, 34, 38.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

payments due to the French government.